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Abstract
Recent theoretical contributions have suggested peer-group eﬀects as a potential
explanation for several puzzles in macroeconomics, but their empirical relevance for
intertemporal consumption choice is an open question. We derive an extension of the
standard life-cycle model that allows for consumption externalities. In this framework, we
propose a social multiplier approach to distinguish true externalities from merely correlated
eﬀects. Estimating our model using US panel data, we ﬁnd strong predictable co-movement
of household consumption within peer groups. Although much of this co-movement reﬂects
correlated eﬀects only, there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence for moderate consumption
externalities across several plausible peer-group speciﬁcations.
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remaining errors are our own responsibility.Consumption is arguably a social experience, and the position of other people with respect to
our own consumption often matters to us. The idea of social interaction is reﬂected, for example,
in references to ”conspicuous consumption” or "keeping up with the Joneses", which are
commonplace in casual discussions about the determinants of particular consumption patterns.
Consistent with this, psychologists, sociologists and economists have gathered evidence showing
that consumers’ well-being is aﬀected by their relative economic standing rather than their
absolute resources alone.1 Within economics, early discussions of consumption externalities,
or peer eﬀects, actually date back at least to the seminal contributions of Duesenberry (1949)
and Leibenstein (1950). More recently, a growing literature in macroeconomics and ﬁnance has
resorted to models featuring consumption externalities in order to explain prominent empirical
puzzles.2
Against this backdrop, it is surprising that economists have largely ignored consumption
externalities when studying the determinants of intertemporal consumption choice in actual
micro-level data. Clearly, some "stylized facts" about household consumption are suggestive
of, or at least compatible with, peer eﬀects: rather than being smooth, life-cycle consumption
proﬁles feature humps and bumps whose exact shapes appear to depend on characteristics of
the respective households. On the one hand, this might simply mirror changing demographic
situations that have a direct eﬀect on the utility derived from a given level of consumption.
On the other hand, synchronized consumption patterns within groups could also indicate the
presence of peer eﬀects. Given the empirical support for peer-group phenomena in other ﬁelds,
their relevance for intertemporal consumption decisions surely deserves closer investigation.
We begin our own study by proposing a theoretical model of consumption that allows for
peer eﬀects. Instead of introducing an ad hoc behavioural model, we extend the standard
life-cycle model to account for the notion of ”keeping up with the Joneses” in individual
felicity functions. Thus, our model is fully consistent with the usual forward-looking utility
maximization framework as presented, for example, in Browning and Crossley (2001). Apart
from providing a coherent economic foundation for our exercise, this approach also ensures
1A recent example is Luttmer (2006), who also provides further references to this quite sizable literature.
2Prominent examples of this line of research include Abel (1990), Galí (1994), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) or Binder and Pesaran (2001).
1that our results are easily compared to those obtained from more traditional versions of the
model. Speciﬁcally, our speciﬁcation nests the standard power utility model as well as its
demographics-augmented variant as special cases.
In order to evaluate the model empirically, we derive its ﬁrst-order condition, an extended
version of the well-known consumption Euler equation, and estimate it using US micro data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Standard estimation techniques uncover
substantial predictable consumption co-movement within peer groups, suggesting the presence
of strong consumption externalities. However, these results have to be taken with caution,
because estimation under the usual Euler equation framework is vulnerable to even minor
misspeciﬁcations. The diﬃculty is related to what Manski (1993; 1995) calls the ”reﬂection
problem”. Basically, to identify and estimate true externalities, we need to discriminate
between two competing hypotheses: Is individual consumption growth really aﬀected by peer-
group behaviour (endogenous eﬀects) or does it display co-movement within groups merely
because individuals share similar unobserved characteristics or suﬀer similar predictable shocks
(correlated eﬀects)?
Disentangling actual peer-group phenomena from correlated eﬀects constitutes the principal
challenge for our empirical application. The solution we propose is based on exploiting a
social multiplier. Speciﬁcally, we adapt Manski’s reﬂection problem to the case of dynamic
Euler equations with endogenous regressors. This step allows us to derive further equilibrium
conditions implied by our extended model; using these, we can re-assess peer eﬀects in
intertemporal consumption and provide a more robust test of their relevance. Interestingly,
once correlated eﬀects are adequately accounted for, our estimation results no longer point to
the very strong consumption externalities suggested by the standard estimation approach. Still,
we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence for moderate peer eﬀects across a range of plausible
speciﬁcations.
Apart from the aforementioned early contributions that have inspired this paper, our
research is also related to a number of papers in the more recent literature. First, our
analysis extends existing microeconomic studies of intertemporal consumption proﬁles by
incorporating peer eﬀects. Previous research has shown that a simple power utility version
2of the intertemporal model cannot explain key features of life-cycle consumption. However,
some progress has been achieved with the inclusion of demographic preference shifters, as
suggested, for example, by Blundell et al. (1994) and Attanasio et al. (1999). Because
our approach nests this class of models, we can assess the importance of peer eﬀects while
controlling for the direct impact of relevant (common) demographics. In the same literature,
there have also been a few contributions devoted to "internal" habit formation, i.e., persistent
eﬀects of an individual’s own consumption experience over time. Yet, the empirical evidence
for internal habits is mixed at best, judging from the papers by Dynan (2000), Guariglia and
Rossi (2002), Alessie and Teppa (2002), Ravina (2005) and Browning and Collado (2007).
Our approach diﬀers from these contributions in that we focus on "external" habit formation:
instead of looking at current consumption relative to past consumption for a given individual,
we investigate the relationship between an individual’s current consumption and that of her
peers. Our work is, therefore, a natural complement to the literature on internal habits, notably
Dynan (2000), who estimates modiﬁed Euler equations based on the same US micro data that
we use. Most closely related to our work is the study by Ravina (2005). Using expenditure
data from Californian credit card holders, she studies the role of internal and external habits
for intertemporal consumption choice. However, her paper deﬁnes "external habits" based on a
strictly geographic notion of "neighbourhood eﬀects", whereas we focus on peer groups deﬁned
in terms of sociodemographic characteristics.
A second related strand of the literature is concerned with intra-period consumption
patterns. In fact, most of the studies investigating peer eﬀects in consumption have looked at
commodity demand. Building on theoretical work of Gaertner (1974) and Pollak (1976), Alessie
and Kapteyn (1991) and Kapteyn et al. (1997), for instance, have shown that peer eﬀects
are important for estimating budget share equations. Essentially, these authors investigate
the role of "fads and fashions" in the allocation of total expenditure to certain categories of
consumption, such as clothing, food or transportation. In terms of economic analysis, their
work can be understood as referring to the second stage of a two-stage budgeting procedure.
Our study, in turn, focuses on the ﬁrst stage, namely the intertemporal allocation decision.
Third, our analysis sheds light on the empirical plausibility of recent theoretical con-
3tributions that have suggested consumption externalities as potential solutions to empirical
puzzles in macroeconomics and ﬁnance. Indeed, the recent macroeconomic literature has
readily adopted various kinds of internal and external habit speciﬁcations, although supporting
evidence from microeconomic studies is either scarce or absent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is preparatory and reviews
the standard life-cycle model, which we extend, in section 2, to allow for peer eﬀects. In
section 3, we present our data and describe the way we construct peer groups. This is
followed by a detailed exposition of econometric issues in section 4, where we derive our model
speciﬁcation and discuss identiﬁcation and inference. In section 5, we turn to our results and
their interpretation. Section 6 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks. Less instructive derivations
and econometric technicalities are relegated to the appendix.
1T h e L i f e - C y c l e M o d e l
In this section we brieﬂy review the main features of the canonical life-cycle model of
consumption. This model, which undoubtedly represents the cornerstone in modern literature
on consumption, also forms the conceptual basis for our own study.
Consider the intertemporal optimization problem of a ﬁnite-lived consumer h at time t who
faces a riskless asset with real after-tax rate of return Rh
t+1. Assume that the consumer has von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and derives utility from consumption Ch,w i t hi n t r a - p e r i o d
felicity function u. Assume further that the consumer’s rate of time preference is β. We can
then write her maximization problem as
max Et
⎡
⎣
T−t X
j=0
βju(Ch
t+j)
⎤
⎦ (1)
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint; Et denotes the conditional expectations operator
in time t, T − t the consumer’s remaining life-span. The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem
is the familiar Euler equation
u0
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t
´
= βEt
h
u0
³
Ch
t+1
´
Rh
t+1
i
. (2)
4The left-hand side represents the immediate loss in utility if the consumer marginally increases
her asset holdings in t. The right-hand side is the increase in (discounted expected) utility she
obtains from the corresponding extra asset payoﬀ in t +1 . At an optimum, marginal gains
and losses must be exactly equal. Straightforward as it is, this ﬁrst-order condition of the
intertemporal maximization problem is at the core of the life-cycle model throughout all its
variants. Intuitively, a rational and farsighted individual aims at smoothing marginal utility
throughout her life, with the after-tax interest rate Rh
t+1 representing the opportunity cost of
period t consumption relative to consumption in period t +1 .
2 Peer-Group Eﬀects in the Euler Equation Framework
The standard way to proceed is to parameterize the felicity function u(·), notably by assuming
preferences of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type. Estimation is then based on
a log-linearized version of (2). In the present paper, we slightly depart from this practice and
i n s t e a df o l l o wa na p p r o a c hﬁrst suggested by Attanasio and Browning (1995). Their idea is to
start directly from a model for marginal utility u0 (·) (or the natural logarithm thereof) that
allows for more ﬂexible while still tractable preference speciﬁcations. Hence we are able to
test for the importance of peer-group eﬀects without relying on an overly restrictive modelling
context. As Attanasio and Browning (1995) emphasize, the approach comes at a low cost,
since it is still possible to recover the implied utility function by means of integration, if so
desired. Likewise, the approach is well-grounded in consumption theory insofar as the empirical
model we postulate nests the standard CRRA case with or without additional demographic
preference shifters. To illustrate this point, we show in appendix A1 how our framework easily
accommodates an extended version of the typical CRRA model with peer eﬀects.
With respect to Attanasio and Browning (1995), our central innovation is to add the
possibility of consumption externalities. Thus, apart from the key determinants of marginal
utility already considered in their model, we allow marginal utility to be also aﬀected by the
current consumption level of likely peers. Speciﬁcally, we assume that individual marginal
5utility u0 (·) is characterized by
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where Dh
t represents a vector of basic household characteristics that act as preference shifters,
such as family size or the number of children. Such preference shifters can also be motivated as
implicit equivalence scales. Accordingly, the speciﬁcation in (3) ﬂexibly allows for time-variant
preferences as well as implicit adjustments of household consumption in response to changing
family compositions.
Next, lnCh
t represents household h’s log consumption, while ARITM
h
ln
³
C
j
t
´
|X
j
t = Xh
t
i
denotes the arithmetic mean of the log consumption levels within household h’s peer group, i.e.,
among households that share some common sociodemographic characteristics Xh
t . Intuitively,
while marginal utility is assumed to decline in the individual’s own consumption level, we posit
t h a ti tm a ya l s od e p e n do nc u r r e n tp e e r - g r o u pc o n s umption, capturing notions of status concern
or jealousy. Thus, our speciﬁcation encompasses intertemporal consumption complementarities
between similar households. The central parameter of interest is γ, which captures the strength
of possible peer eﬀects. It measures the extent to which the consumption of a given household
reacts to the average household consumption of its respective peers.3
Although it might ﬁrst seem somewhat ad hoc, the speciﬁcation given by (3) is really but a
slight extension of the standard power utility model. In particular, the basic "stripped down"
CRRA model is nested as a special case for θ = γ =0 . This is important since it allows
us to construct simple t- or F-tests for consumption externalities against more traditional
alternatives.
Combining (3) with a linearized version of the general Euler equation (2), we obtain
∆ln
³
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t+1
´
= α + ∆Dh
t+1θ + σ lnRh
t+1 + γARITM
h
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+ εh
t+1, (4)
3Note that (3) implicitly treats peer-group consumption at the household level as a potential determinant
of marginal utility. Theoretically, it is possible to also incorporate demographic preference shifters in the peer-
g r o u pt e r ms oa st oa d j u s tf o rd i ﬀerences in household size. However, since it is a priori unclear which of the
two approaches is more plausible, we retain the assumption that any relevant consumption externalities operate
at the household level. This formulation has the advantage that changes in household composition provide an
extra source of within-peer-group variation in intertemporal consumption, thus facilitating inference.
6where α contains both the logarithm of the discount rate, β, and higher-order terms stemming
from the linearization.4 The demographic preference shifters Dh
t+1 now show up in diﬀerences,
corresponding to the notion that changes in, say, household size or the number of children
should have an eﬀect on the household’s growth rate of consumption.
It seems worthwhile to provide some intuition for the above Euler equation. After
controlling for the eﬀect of demographics, household consumption grow t hi ss e e nt od e p e n d
on the interest rate and on average peer-group consumption growth. The eﬀect of the interest
rate, on the one hand, reﬂects an intertemporal substitution motive standard in intertemporal
Euler equations. Peer-group consumption growth, on the other hand, is included because
households may aim at smoothing their own consumption proﬁle relative to that of their peers.
One important insight from (4) is that the goal of "keeping up with the Joneses" does not
imply excessive current consumption to increase social status. Rather, since the intertemporal
budget constraint requires any increase in current consumption to be balanced against lower
future consumption, rational forward-looking individuals attempt to maintain their relative
position within their peer group as a means of smoothing their marginal utility.
At this point, one additional modiﬁcation is necessary for us to be able to test for peer-
group eﬀects. In fact, from looking at (4), one might (and should) be concerned that estimates
of γ will pick up spurious correlation rather than true consumption externalities. Speciﬁcally,
direct eﬀects of the stratiﬁcation variables X on chosen consumption growth could be falsely
interpreted as evidence for peer eﬀects. For example, one might argue that diﬀerent degrees of
education–an important dimension for social comparisons–might also imply diﬀerent degrees
of impatience, i.e., higher or lower discount rates β. As such a phenomenon would concern
the whole peer group, similar behaviour could easily be mistaken as evidence for peer eﬀects,
whereas the true explanation rests on correlated eﬀects related to observable demographics. In
order to distinguish between these two potential phenomena, we control for the direct eﬀects
of our stratiﬁcation variables by including them as additional regressors. This approach neatly
accommodates two diﬀerent strands of the literature. First, we comply with the ”reﬂection
problem” framework proposed by Manski (1993, 1995) to allow for both endogenous and
4See appendix A2 for a complete derivation of equation (4).
7correlated eﬀects in what Manski refers to as a "linear endogenous-eﬀects model". Second,
we take up the reasoning put forward in part of the consumption literature that, apart from
t h ep r e f e r e n c es h i f t e r sDh
t already introduced above, demographics also have to be used to
allow a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the discount rate.5 Thus, by including the additional term
Xh
t λ, we implicitly parameterize lnβ, which was previously buried in the intercept.6
Our new, augmented Euler equations reads as
∆ln
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+Xh
t λ+εh
t+1. (5)
Equation (5) is the starting point for our estimation strategy. As a practical matter, we
will compute cell averages for a given set of discretized stratiﬁcation variables to obtain
nonparametric estimates for ARITM
h
·|X
j
t = Xh
t
i
. Note that we must compute these cell
averages for each year t. This implies that estimated peer-group means of any endogenous
variable have to be treated themselves as endogenous variables with respect to the time
dimension. Consequently, such variables will have to be instrumented. In addition,
replacing the peer-group mean, ARITM
h
∆ln
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C
j
t+1
´
|X
j
t = Xh
t
i
,b yaﬁrst-step estimate,
ARITMN
h
∆ln
³
C
j
t
´
|X
j
t+1 = Xh
t
i
, gives rise to a generated regressor problem that we need
to take into account when computing asymptotic standard errors.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the consumers’ Euler equations are necessary
conditions for any equilibrium within our framework. Building the analysis on such Euler
equations, therefore, has the considerable advantage of providing estimates of the relevant
preference parameters without a full characterization of the particular equilibrium. Even so,
identiﬁcation in this context requires that there exist suﬃcient exclusion restrictions to separate
individual-level determinants of consumption growth from potential peer eﬀects. In our case,
this requirement is met by within-peer-group variation in demographicp r e f e r e n c es h i f t e r s
and/or the after-tax interest rate. Speciﬁcally, the demographic preference shifters exploit
the fact that each household aims at smoothing expected discounted marginal utility, which is
5Prominent examples include Lawrance (1991), Attanasio and Browning (1995) and Dynan (2000).
6Ad i ﬀerent issue is the likely presence of common unpredictable shocks within peer groups. It is important to
note that such shocks do not confound our analysis, because peer-group consumption–an endogenous variable–
will be instrumented with lagged information throughout. In this sense, we are only dealing with predictable or
planned co-movement of consumption that is picked up by our instruments.
8aﬀected by its own demographic composition. This gives rise to exogenous within-peer-group
variation in household consumption levels. Heterogeneity in after-tax interest rates, in turn,
implies diﬀerences in the intertemporal substitution motive within peer groups that provide an
additional source of independent variation. Conceptually, these two features also distinguish
the model in (5) from tests of full consumption insurance with perfect capital markets and
pareto-eﬃcient equilibria which are based on marginal utility rather than consumption levels
(see, for example, Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991)).
3T h e D a t a
This section brieﬂy describes the data we use for our study. In addition, we provide a
comprehensive discussion of how we deﬁne and construct peer groups. We also report some
descriptive statistics about the ﬁnal samples used in the estimation.
3.1. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
Our analysis is based on data from the well-known Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of US individuals and their
families. It has been ongoing since 1968. The data were collected annually through to 1997,
and biennially starting in 1999. While the PSID has a very broad content, including economic
and demographic as well as sociological and psychological measures, its coverage of consumption
behaviour is relatively limited. Indeed, the only measure of consumption available in the ﬁles
is food consumption (at home and in restaurants), which, moreover, was a recurrent item in
the survey questionnaire between 1974 and 1987. Accordingly, the PSID oﬀers a maximum
of 14 consecutive annual observations to investigate households’ intertemporal consumption
patterns.
Having data on food expenditure only is an obvious drawback, even if the empirical
consumption literature has commonly used such data to explore consumer behaviour.7 The
critical question is whether or not food consumption provides a reasonable proxy for overall
7Prominent examples include Hall and Mishkin (1982), Hotz et al. (1988), Zeldes (1989), Altug and Miller
(1990), Lawrance (1991), Cochrane (1991), Runkle (1991), Shea (1995), Hayashi et al. (1996), Jacobs (1999),
Dynan (2000), Cox et al. (2004), Hurst (2004) or Hurst and Staﬀord (2004).
9consumption for the purposes of our particular application. A priori, we would expect other
consumption categories, such as clothing or cars, to be more promising candidates for peer
eﬀects. However, it is important to keep in mind that we are not looking for intertemporal
peer eﬀects in speciﬁc consumption categories; instead we would like to assess their relevance for
comprehensive consumption baskets. Accordingly, we wonder to what extent food consumption
is representative for broader consumption measures in terms of conspicuousness. While there
is not much evidence on this issue, recent work by Heﬀetz (2004) provides some reassurance.
B a s e do nh i so w ns u r v e y ,H e ﬀetz constructs three diﬀerent "visibility indices" to measure
the conspicuousness of thirty-one distinct consumption categories covering more than 95%
of consumption reported by the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). In all three indices,
both food at home and food outside home consistently rank in the (upper) middle of the
distribution, with their exact positions ranging between seven and ﬁfteen. The two food
consumption categories continue to appear fairly representative once the expenditure categories
are appropriately value weighted. Speciﬁcally, although some large categories, like clothing,
cars or furniture, always rank among the top ﬁve categories on the list, other quantitatively
important categories, such as utilities, medical care or insurance policies, are found much
further down the visibility scales. Our tentative conclusion is that food consumption, while
narrower an aggregate than we would wish, may not be a bad proxy for overall consumption
in terms of susceptibility to peer eﬀects.
As mentioned, the data we use cover the interview period 1974 through 1987. After
necessary data cleaning, which is duly documented in appendix A3, our ﬁnal data set comprises
some 26,000 observations.
3.2. Peer-Group Construction
The speciﬁcation of peer groups is critical for any analysis of social interactions. Because
the reference groups we choose to consider are taken to be characteristic of a household’s
social environment, we must take a stance on what personal attributes plausibly deﬁne such
an environment. The ideal solution would be to use observed behaviour and infer the most
relevant determinants or dimensions of social reference groups directly from the data. However,
as pointed out by Manski (1993; 1995) in his seminal contribution on endogenous social eﬀects,
10such an approach would render identiﬁcation impossible and make the social eﬀects model hold
tautologically. Thus he concludes that ”informed speciﬁcation of reference groups is a necessary
prelude to analysis of social eﬀects” (Manski, 1993 (p. 536)). In light of this, we borrow results
from the literature on group processes and social comparison in social psychology to motivate
our sample stratiﬁcation. Studies of social comparison processes (see, for example, Festinger,
1954) emphasize that people primarily compare themselves to members of their own social
group, i.e., to individuals who are similar along dimensions such as age, gender or education.
As in Kapteyn et al. (1997), we will therefore treat households whose heads share such basic
characteristics as relevant reference groups.
Given the focus of our exercise, it seems important to account for characteristics related to
social achievement and status. These clearly include age and education–two categories used in
a study by Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998)–but we prefer to also consider other characteristics
that are relevant to an individual’s self-conception, such as race, gender, family status,
occupation and urbanity. Hence, we construct reference groups based on diﬀerent subsets
of the following attributes: age cohort, race, gender, the presence of children, educational
attainment, occupational status and ”size of the nearest city” as a measure for urbanity.8
Speciﬁcally, cell averages are computed using six-year cohorts based on the household head’s
age in 1974; a dummy indicating whether the household head is white or non-white; a gender
dummy; a dummy indicating whether or not there are children living in the household; a
categorical education variable that takes on one of three diﬀerent values depending on whether
the household head has had less than high school, a high school degree or a completed college
education; a variable summarizing occupational status as either "blue collar", "white collar" or
"other", based on the PSID’s detailed employment information; and lastly a city size variable
that indicates whether the nearest city has less than 50,000, between 50,000 and 500,000 or
more than 500,000 inhabitants.
Obviously, the list of strata-deﬁning characteristics could be extended even further. In a
sample of limited size, however, this has to be traded oﬀ against the disadvantage of ending
8Some of these same variables have also been found to be important predictors for individual welfare functions
over income as studied in the Leyden approach (see, for example, van Praag and Frijters, 1999), which provides
additional support for our stratiﬁcation strategy. We also experimented with regional dummies as both an
alternative and a complement to "urbanity", but found the results essentially unaﬀected.
11up with overly small reference groups or substantial data losses. Indeed, considering all of the
seven above-mentioned stratiﬁcation variables simultaneously already leads to a considerable
reduction in sample size. We, therefore, examine a range of diﬀerent stratiﬁcations, applying
between ﬁve and seven of the above-mentioned characteristics at a time.
In order to obtain a meaningful proxy for peer-group means, we consider only strata
consisting of at least 15 households in a given year. This choice again represents a compromise
between diﬀerent goals. While larger cell sizes are in principle desirable, they would also imply
more data losses for a given set of stratiﬁcation variables, so we have to strike a balance.
Even so, the need to delete observations pertaining to overly small reference groups causes a
reduction of our original sample to ﬁnal sizes between 18,126 and 8,324 observations, depending
on the number and type of stratiﬁcation variables under consideration.
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics for our samples before and after the deletion
of households belonging to small peer groups. Comparison shows that our samples generally
become "more male", "more white", "less urban", "more educated" and "more white collar"
as well as somewhat "less childless" as a consequence of data deletions, whereas compositional
changes in terms of birth cohorts are moderate. Essentially, imposing a lower bound on cell
size removes most of the observations pertaining to less common household heads. Although
this is of course unfortunate, we still ﬁnd most of our ﬁnal samples relatively well-balanced
even with respect to other studies that do not face data constraints associated with peer-
group construction. For example, many authors in the consumption literature have dropped
female-headed households from their sample at the outset, thus obtaining the same selectivity
we are faced with as a result of our necessary data deletions. In conclusion, our focus on
households belonging to suﬃciently big reference groups implies a natural qualiﬁcation on
the interpretation of our results, insofar as we cannot extrapolate to other subpopulations.
Nevertheless, our sample provides interesting insights about sizeable and important strata of
society.
12Table 1: Sample summary statistics before and after deletion of small cells*
Before Samples after deletion of small cells
deletions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cohort (age in 1974)
5-10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11-16 2.54 1.71 1.95 1.09 1.28 1.38 0.80
17-22 15.91 17.00 17.58 18.56 17.61 19.57 21.06
23-28 23.20 26.24 26.59 31.17 29.71 32.71 41.76
29-34 13.59 14.98 14.97 16.94 15.49 16.49 19.31
35-40 10.11 9.10 9.84 7.52 8.87 7.79 6.86
41-46 13.02 13.50 12.54 10.12 11.81 12.20 6.74
47-52 11.50 12.19 11.26 10.03 10.49 8.27 3.29
53-58 7.35 4.18 4.39 3.23 3.87 1.22 0.00
59-65 2.75 1.10 0.86 1.32 0.86 0.37 0.18
Gender
female 13.89 0.42 0.64 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.41
male 86.11 99.58 99.36 99.48 99.50 99.45 99.59
Race
white 90.56 99.91 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
non-white 9.44 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
City Size
less than 50,000 39.55 45.44 44.21 44.78 46.32 46.68 46.40
between 50,000 and 500,000 38.08 38.09 39.04 39.59 39.20 37.81 38.35
more than 500,000 22.37 16.46 16.76 15.63 14.48 15.51 15.26
Education
less than high school 21.79 14.67 17.69 12.14 17.24 11.12 6.33
high school or more 36.33 36.89 35.51 36.06 35.26 31.18 29.32
finished college or more 41.88 48.44 46.80 51.81 47.50 57.69 64.34
Occupation
"blue collar" 41.67 42.04 45.01 40.78 43.66 43.02 39.01
"white collar" 46.29 50.51 51.92 52.09 53.10 56.47 60.59
other 12.04 7.44 3.06 7.14 3.24 0.51 0.38
Any children
no 42.80 37.40 35.93 30.83 30.11 31.57 16.59
yes 57.20 62.60 64.07 69.17 69.89 68.43 83.41
Sample Size 26,358 18,126 18,206 13,704 14,791 12,450 8,324
Stratification 
A g e … XXXXXX
G e n d e r … XXXXXX
R a c e … XXXXXX
C i t y  s i z e … XXXXXX
E d u c a t i o n … XXX X
Occupation … X X X X
Any children … X X X
*All figures are in percent. Computations for baseline samples (minimum cell size = 15).
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4.1. The Reﬂection Problem and Omitted Correlated Eﬀects
In principle it is possible to estimate an equation like (5) using instrumental variables
(IV). Thus we will report the corresponding results below. However, estimation is a rather
delicate issue in this case. In particular, results are probably very sensitive to even minor
misspeciﬁcation (or omission) of direct demographic eﬀects. To be sure, we can (and do) control
for direct eﬀects from our stratiﬁcation variables by including these dummies as additional
regressors. Yet, such direct controls are necessarily imperfect. For one thing, eﬀects could stem
from complicated interactions of the demographic information we use. Further, consumption
growth might be aﬀected by additional demographic factors omitted from the model. This will
remain a potential problem even if a speciﬁcation already takes into account all variables that
have been identiﬁed as relevant in the previous literature. In essence, there is no safe guidance
as to what precise set of demographic variables has to be included in taking the life-cycle theory
to the data. In most applications, this point may be a purely academic one. For our study,
however, it is critical, because it further raises the challenge of discriminating between true
consumption externalities and merely correlated eﬀects.
Basically, any omission of direct demographic eﬀects in (5) is likely to cause an upward
bias in the estimate for γ, combined with an uninformative J-statistic. The reason lies in the
mechanics of IV estimators. Recall that estimates are obtained from minimizing the (weighted)
correlations between instruments and residuals, i.e., estimated errors. The estimator thus tends
to purge such components from the residual that are correlated with the instruments. In the
case of equation (5), this may imply that omitted demographic eﬀects or predictable ”common
shocks” within peer groups are spuriously eliminated by assigning a value near 1 to γ.M o r e o v e r ,
although the model is clearly misspeciﬁed in this case, the misspeciﬁcation would be virtually
impossible to detect. In order to understand why the test of overidentifying restrictions may
fail, note that it is based on the minimized objective function of the estimator. Its power to
reject a given speciﬁcation prevails only to the extent that the estimated error term actually
14displays suﬃcient correlation with the instruments. Given the above reasoning, it seems fair
to suspect that the J-test may have very low power.
As a bottom line, speciﬁcation (5) is very vulnerable to even minor omissions of relevant
demographic information. Above and beyond what this would imply for any analysis of
micro consumption data, it poses the very concrete problem here that our main coeﬃcient
of interest might easily be upward biased, thus jeopardizing any conclusions about peer-group
vs. correlated eﬀects. Importantly, this is true despite the fact that the model is well identiﬁed
under the assumption of correct speciﬁcation and the availability of valid instruments.
However, the situation is not quite as unfortunate as it might ﬁrst seem. The solution we
propose relies on the fact that optimal consumption growth rates need to be consistent within
peer groups. This insight provides us with a set of additional equilibrium restrictions that can
be exploited to discriminate between our two hypotheses of interest. Speciﬁcally, the additional
equilibrium conditions allow us to transform our model and obtain a new speciﬁcation which
does not suﬀer from the aforementioned shortcomings. The general idea of exploiting an
internal consistency argument goes back to Manski’s (1993; 1995) contributions on how to
circumvent the reﬂection problem in the identiﬁcation of endogenous social eﬀects. Here we
adapt Manski’s framework to the case of IV estimation and inference for Euler equations
featuring contemporaneous consumption externalities.
First, by aggregating equation (5) for each peer group separately, we obtain
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which is referred to as a ”social equilibrium condition” for each stratum. This additional
equilibrium restriction recognizes the fact that the consumption growth terms on both sides of
the Euler equation have to be mutually consistent.
15Next, we assume that γ is not exactly equal to 1. Rearranging terms allows us to write
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Thus, the social equilibrium condition (7) implies that, for each population stratum, peer-
group consumption growth depends only on the peer-group means of the other explanatory
variables, i.e., averages of family size changes, the average log after-tax interest rate and
demographics dummies. In order to exploit these additional restrictions, we combine condition
(7) with the augmented Euler equation (5) to obtain
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has been introduced as a convenient
shorthand notation for the new combined error term. Equation (8) will serve as our principal
estimating equation. Of course, in the estimation we need to replace the peer-group means
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respective sample stratiﬁcation.
Note that (8) provides a much improved basis to estimate actual peer eﬀects and properly
assess model speciﬁcation. Above all, the right-hand side of the equation no longer includes
endogenous peer-group consumption growth as a regressor. Recall that this term is the source
of concern in our initial equation (5), since we suspect it to spuriously pick up any predictable
group-speciﬁc components from the error term.
Some intuition should be provided regarding the way consumption externalities operate in
16(8). In fact, these externalities are now estimated from a social multiplier, i.e., the indirect
eﬀects on a peer’s optimal consumption growth operating through peer-group averages of the
standard explanatory variables. To give an example, consider the interest rate–a theoretically
undisputed determinant of consumption growth. To the extent that higher average interest
r a t e sf a c e db yh e rp e e r sr a i s ea v e r a g ec o n s u m p tion growth in an individual’s peer group, they
also cause the individual herself to raise consumption growth if peer-group eﬀects are present.
This eﬀect operates in addition to any direct intertemporal substitution motive (as determined
by the individual’s own interest rate) and explains why the coeﬃcient in front of the peer-
group interest rate contains
γ
1−γ as a multiplier. Indeed, equation (8) in principle allows
disentangling the direct individual from the indirect social eﬀects of all standard explanatory
variables. The requirement is that there is some household-level variation in these variables
relative to their respective peer-group averages. Consider again the example of interest rates.
Many authors have estimated consumption Euler equations using pre-tax interest rates. We
do not follow this practice here, precisely because it would preclude a distinction between the
eﬀect on consumption of the interest rate faced by the individual herself and the one faced by
her peers–both interest rate terms in (8) would be identical. This gives us a strong rationale
for using after-tax interest rates Rh
t+1 as regressors, thereby identifying both eﬀects of interest.
Note further that we can also identify correlated eﬀects as captured in Xh
t .T h ec o e ﬃcient γ
being identiﬁed from the social multipliers, we can isolate the direct impact of the stratiﬁcation
variables by netting out, from the total eﬀects
³
1+
γ
1−γ
´
λ, any indirect eﬀects
³
γ
1−γ
´
λ that
stem from the consumption externality. Thus, the reﬂection problem framework allows us to
conduct proper inference with respect to all parameters of interest.
As a practical matter, however, the above discussion also suggests that estimation remains
a challenge, especially since the variation we can exploit to estimate consumption externalities
must come from within peer groups. Moreover, some of the explanatory variables such as the
interest rate are endogenous.9 These variables (and their respective peer-group averages) need
to be instrumented, which reduces the necessary variation even further. Hence, it may be
9By contrast, we maintain the standard assumption that the demographic preference shifters ∆Dt+1 are
exogenous to the consumption decision (both at the level of the individual and the peer group) and thus need
not be instrumented.
17diﬃcult to obtain very precise estimates of the parameters of interest.
4.2. Explanatory Variables and Instrument Choice
4.2.1. Explanatory variables. In order to estimate Euler equations on micro data, it
is essential to properly account for real-life heterogeneity and demographic variation. At
a minimum, most economists have considered changes in household size as an important
determinant of consumption growth.10 We follow the literature by including family size,
the number of major adults and the number of children as preference shifters Dt+1 in our
parameterization for marginal utility, (3). Accordingly, the Euler equations (4), (5), and (8)
include changes in these demographic variables as additional regressors.
Moreover, as already discussed above, we take up the reasoning of Lawrance (1991) and
others and include further demographics directly in the Euler equation to allow for diﬀerences
in time preference rates across diﬀerent subpopulations. Note that this is crucial in our
application in order to distinguish endogenous social eﬀects from correlated eﬀects, i.e., direct
eﬀects of the stratiﬁcation variables on the dependent variable. Speciﬁcally, since Lawrance
(1991) argues that some of our stratiﬁcation variables could be associated with large diﬀerences
in time preference rates across subpopulations, we include all our stratiﬁcation variables as
explanatory variables in equation (5). Hence, Xh
t comprises all of the cohort, race, gender,
children, education, occupation and urbanity dummies used for peer-group stratiﬁcation in the
respective sample. As a proxy for the riskless asset return Rh
t+1, we consider the real after-
tax one year US T-Bill rate, constructed as the average of twelve year-to-year rates. Lastly,
we construct peer-group averages of all the explanatory variables since these are needed for
estimating (8).
4.2.2. Instrument choice. All of our estimating equations contain some endogenous
regressors. In particular, the real after-tax interest rate in (5) and (8) is an endogenous variable
that needs to be instrumented. Furthermore, the peer-group mean of log consumption growth
in equation (5) naturally needs to be instrumented, as well. Within a forward-looking, rational
expectations framework like the one considered here, every variable that is contained in the
10Prominent examples include Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995), Attanasio and Browning (1995), Attanasio
et al. (1999) or Dynan (2000). See Deaton (1992) or Attanasio (1999) for an overview.
18current information set basically provides a valid instrument. A qualiﬁer is necessary insofar
as measurement error in levels or time-aggregation can lead to autocorrelation in growth rates,
thus invalidating the ﬁr s tl a go f ,s a y ,i n c o m eg r o w t ha sa ni n s t r u m e n tf o rc u r r e n ti n c o m eg r o w t h .
Apart from these considerations on instrument validity, we try throughout to pick instruments
that are likely to contain a lot of information about the endogenous variables. The goal is to
have high predictive power for our endogenous regressors without excessive instrumentation,
i.e., without recourse to many (weak) instruments that simply drive up the degrees of freedom.
Moreover, we attempt to attain a reasonable balance between aggregate and individual-speciﬁc
variables. Thus, apart from all exogenous variables, we use four lags of the real T-Bill rate,
four lags of real stock returns from the S&P 500, the second to fourth lag of the CPI inﬂation
rate, the second and third lag of real income growth and their squares and cubes as well as
lagged labour market status of head and spouse as instruments.
5 Estimation Results
5.1. Results for Equation (5)
We start by estimating (5) using two-step GMM. The exact formulation of the estimator
is described in appendix A4, which also details how we account for sampling variability in
the estimated peer-group means, a variant of the "generated regressor" problem discussed, for
example, in Newey and McFadden (1994).
Table 2 presents point estimates along with appropriately adjusted standard errors for
all six peer-group stratiﬁcations. Note ﬁrst that the estimates tend to lie in a reasonable
range, with conﬁdence intervals suﬃciently small to pin down parameter values quite precisely.
The results also diﬀer little across peer-group speciﬁcations, although diﬀerent stratiﬁcation
strategies obviously imply signiﬁcant variation in sample size and composition. The coeﬃcients
pertaining to changes in household size are all of the expected sign and size. For instance,
consumption growth is estimated to rise by roughly 20%, ceteris paribus, with the arrival of a
new major adult in the household, whereas one additional child increases consumption growth
by less than 10%. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ appears relatively small, taking
a value between 0.06 and 0.07.
19Table 2: Estimates for Euler equation including peer-group consumption growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parameter
∆ family size 0.091 0.094 0.099 0.090 0.105 0.106
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0089) (0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0120)
∆ major adults 0.103  0.109 0.089 0.131 0.106 0.107
(0.0172) (0.0176) (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0291)
∆ children -0.018 -0.021 -0.032 -0.029 -0.033 -0.052
(0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0133)
σ 0.061 0.058 0.068 0.055 0.067 0.069
(0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0190) (0.0207)
γ 0.955  0.957 0.943 0.946 0.883 0.900
(0.0270) (0.0242) (0.0298) (0.0219) (0.0443) (0.0405)
Stratification 
A g e XXXXXX
G e n d e r XXXXXX
R a c e XXXXXX
C i t y  s i z e XXXXXX
E d u c a t i o n XXX X
Occupation X X X X
Any children X X X
J-statistic 9.23 14.46 9.19 12.09 8.71 7.30
p-value 0.7556 0.3422 0.7584 0.5203 0.7943 0.8861
Sample size 18,126 18,206 13,704 14,791 12,450 8,324
Estimates account for the presence of generated regressors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimation also includes an intercept as well as direct controls for the stratification variables.
Most importantly, however, the parameter associated with peer-group consumption growth,
γ, indicates strong consumption externalities across all stratiﬁcations, with point estimates
between 0.88 and 0.96 and small standard errors. In addition, the usual speciﬁcation tests
lend support to these results in that the J-statistics clearly fail to reject the model at any
conventional level of signiﬁcance.
Basically, the results in Table 2 indicate that the instruments we use are orthogonal
20to deviations of individual consumption growth from its reference-group means, controlling
for other typical regressors. In other words, while consumption within (diﬀerently deﬁned)
subgroups seems to show substantial predictable co-movement, deviations from peer-group
consumption growth appear largely unpredictable. Although we have already argued that it
is impossible to infer reference-group characteristics from observed behaviour, this preliminary
result is still noteworthy. It suggests that there are important predictable trends at the level
of the groups we have chosen to consider. Whether or not the cause lies in actual peer
eﬀects, however, has to be investigated using a framework that is more robust to potential
misspeciﬁcation. Indeed, it seems doubtful whether we should take the high estimates of
γ at face value. Given the structure of equation (5), if our speciﬁcation of demographic
controls is incomplete, omitted correlated eﬀects may easily be mistaken for true consumption
externalities. At the same time, the problem may not become apparent from standard J-tests.
Fortunately, the above social equilibrium conditions provide additional restrictions that we can
exploit to obtain more reliable estimates for γ and the other parameters of the model.
5.2. Results for Equation (8)
Therefore we next turn to the estimation of (8). In each case, the regression again includes
t h ef u l ls e to fd e m o g r a p h i cc o n t r o lv a r i a b l e su s e df o rt h er e s p e c t i v es t r a t i ﬁcation of peer groups.
In addition, all of the estimates in Table 3 account for the presence of generated regressors.
Note ﬁrst that the estimated eﬀects of the demographic preference shifters are virtually
identical to the ones estimated from (5) before. However, imposing the social equilibrium
conditions alters the results with respect to interest rate eﬀects and, most strikingly, the
consumption externality. The direct interest rate eﬀect is now estimated to be somewhat
larger, with point estimates between 0.09 and 0.15, more in line with existing results from the
literature. Peer-group eﬀects, in turn, appear to be considerably smaller now: despite some
variation across stratiﬁcations, the parameter estimates all lie below 0.45 and have suﬃciently
small standard errors to reject the very high values for γ reported in Table 2 at conventional
levels of statistical signiﬁcance. This, together with the much higher J-statistics in Table 3,
clearly supports the hypothesis that inference about peer eﬀects is vulnerable to the omission
of (predictable) group-speciﬁce ﬀects.
21Table 3: Euler equation estimates imposing the social equilibrium condition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parameter
∆ family size 0.096 0.095 0.101 0.092 0.109 0.107
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0086) (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0122)
∆ major adults 0.103 0.109 0.094 0.140 0.101 0.117
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0227) (0.0219) (0.0212) (0.0302)
∆ children -0.019 -0.021 -0.032 -0.030 -0.033 -0.047
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0135)
σ 0.150 0.134 0.115 0.130 0.085 0.093
(0.0691) (0.0592) (0.0635) (0.0539) (0.0581) (0.0628)
γ 0.111 0.237 0.296 0.375 0.367 0.444
(0.1803) (0.1373) (0.1255) (0.0954) (0.0929) (0.1020)
Stratification 
A g e XXXXXX
G e n d e r XXXXXX
R a c e XXXXXX
C i t y  s i z e XXXXXX
E d u c a t i o n XXX X
Occupation X X X X
Any children X X X
J-statistic 46.82 62.20 32.93 58.73 22.15 18.07
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0076 0.0000 0.1383 0.3201
Sample size 18,126 18,206 13,704 14,791 12,450 8,324
Estimates account for the presence of generated regressors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimation also includes an intercept as well as direct controls for the stratification variables.
In the case of equation (5), such omitted eﬀects systematically bias estimates of γ toward
1 while reducing the power of the J-test.
Although we can reject the very strong peer eﬀects implied by our initial estimates based
on (5), the results for certain stratiﬁcations still point to moderate consumption externalities.
Columns (3) through (6) of Table 3, in particular, report estimates of γ that are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Falling into a range from 0.30 to 0.44, these estimates are even fairly close
22in size to the "neighbourhood eﬀects" documented by Ravina (2005).11 Thus, some evidence
for economically meaningful peer eﬀe c t sp e r s i s t se v e na sw ea p p l yam o r er o b u s te s t i m a t i o n
approach based on social multipliers.
Given the range of estimates of γ shown in Table 3, it bears repeating that the estimated
coeﬃcients cannot be used to judge the particular peer-group speciﬁcation under consideration:
to attain identiﬁcation, we have to either assume a certain intensity of peer eﬀects and
then try to learn about the particular groups in which these eﬀects operate; or specify peer
groups a priori and estimate the intensity of consumption externalities conditional on a given
speciﬁcation. This paper applies the latter approach. Accordingly, we cannot infer from
Table 3 which of the diﬀerent stratiﬁcations is most appropriate. However, readers with clear
a priori views on relevant peer group characteristics will certainly attach greater weight to
those columns in Table 3 that pertain to the corresponding stratiﬁcation. At the same time,
stratiﬁcation choices cannot, of course, account for the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in results between
Tables 2 and 3, given that the estimated strength of peer eﬀects is reduced by more than half
across all stratiﬁcations.
Before addressing the implications of our ﬁndings in greater detail, it seems appropriate to
supplement the statistical J-test of our model with a more "economic" test. For this purpose,
Table 4 reports results from a speciﬁcation that includes instrumented current money income
growth as an additional regressor. This speciﬁcation is often referred to as an "excess sensitivity
test" of the life-cycle model. In fact, the theory of intertemporal optimization implies a
coeﬃcient of zero for the added regressor, indicating no impact of predictable income changes
on consumption growth. As can be seen from the table, the coeﬃc i e n tw ee s t i m a t ei si n d e e d
small and insigniﬁcant across all speciﬁcations, while the estimates for all other parameters
remain virtually unchanged. Hence our model speciﬁcation passes this "economic" test of the
life-cycle model: there is no evidence for consumption changes that are related to predictable
changes in income.
11Ravina (2005) estimates an eﬀect of 0.29 of city-level per capita taxable sales on individual credit card
expenditure. Interestingly, this similarity of results should in principle be expected if geographical segregation
based on sociodemographic characteristics is relatively widespread.
23Table 4: Excess sensitivity tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parameter
∆ family size 0.095 0.095 0.100 0.092 0.108 0.109
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0087) (0.0076) (0.0084) (0.0126)
∆ major adults  0.106 0.111 0.097 0.140 0.107 0.128
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0243) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0319)
∆ children -0.019 -0.021 -0.031 -0.029 -0.033 -0.049
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0097) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0142)
σ 0.153 0.136 0.116 0.133 0.092 0.089
(0.0702) (0.0593) (0.0641) (0.0544) (0.0589) (0.0623)
γ 0.101 0.230 0.291 0.371 0.365 0.457
(0.1841) (0.1397) (0.1271) (0.0968) (0.0936) (0.0985)
Income growth -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 0.010 -0.026 -0.052
(0.0264) (0.0285) (0.0314) (0.0398) (0.0392) (0.0477)
Stratification 
A g e XXXXXX
G e n d e r XXXXXX
R a c e XXXXXX
C i t y  s i z e XXXXXX
E d u c a t i o n XXX X
Occupation X X X X
Any children X X X
J-statistic 46.18 61.57 32.19 59.04 21.02 15.56
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0061 0.0000 0.1361 0.4116
Sample size 18,126 18,206 13,704 14,791 12,450 8,324
Estimates account for the presence of generated regressors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimation also includes an intercept as well as direct controls for the stratification variables.
Furthermore, Table 5 checks the robustness of our results with respect to diﬀerent minimum
group sizes. Speciﬁcally, we re-estimate all speciﬁcations shown in Table 3 based on data with
minimum cell sizes of 10, 20 and 25, respectively. The point estimates for the demographic
preference shifters and the interest rate coeﬃcient are essentially unaﬀected. Thus, to conserve
space, the table only reports the results for γ. These also fall mostly into the same range as
24before, although there appears to be a tendency for somewhat higher point estimates in smaller,
more selective and homogeneous samples, be it because of a ﬁner stratiﬁcation strategy (as
noted before) or because of a higher minimum cell size.
Table 5: Robustness checks with respect to changes in minimum cell sizes
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Min. Cell Size 10
γ 0.061 0.202 0.126 0.186 0.285 0.416
(0.1861) (0.1358) (0.1255) (0.1279) (0.0928) (0.0813)
J-statistic 55.82 65.87 52.10 61.03 42.83 34.40
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0048
Sample size 19,843 19,795 17,127 17,601 15,252 11,654
Min. Cell Size 20
γ  0.163 0.233 0.361 0.379 0.436 0.478
(0.1801) (0.1505) (0.1458) (0.1148) (0.1016) (0.1331)
J-statistic 38.71 59.30 22.89 43.16 14.69 21.09
p-value 0.0012 0.0000 0.1166 0.0003 0.5475 0.1749
Sample size 16,179 17,028 10,763 12,517 9,386 5,932
Min. Cell Size 25
γ -0.054 0.139 0.390 0.424 0.402 0.594
(0.3330) (0.2004) (0.1644) (0.1493) (0.1445) (0.1282)
J-statistic 28.27 47.07 20.63 34.10 16.77 16.87
p-value 0.0294 0.0001 0.1932 0.0053 0.4005 0.3942
Sample size 13,333 15,717 8,191 9,742 7,217 4,247
Stratification 
A g e XXXXXX
G e n d e r XXXXXX
R a c e XXXXXX
C i t y  s i z e XXXXXX
Education X X X X
Occupation X X X X
Any children X X X
Estimates account for the presence of generated regressors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimation also includes all other controls of the corresponding models presented in Table 3. 
255.3. Discussion
In sum, our estimation results indicate moderate peer eﬀects in intertemporal consumption
for several plausible peer-group speciﬁcations but do not conﬁrm the prima facie evidence in
favour of very strong consumption externalities. Certainly, estimates from the simple Euler
equation (5) reveal that there is strong predictable co-movement of consumption within peer
groups. Once the analysis is cast in the more robust framework of Manski’s reﬂection problem,
however, this co-movement turns out to be largely driven by omitted group-speciﬁcf a c t o r s
rather than true consumption externalities: although the results for equation (8) point to the
presence of moderate peer eﬀects for certain stratiﬁcations, the estimated values for γ are
consistently below 0.5 and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the high point estimates obtained from
the simple Euler equation.
In this context, the large J-statistics for many speciﬁcations in Tables 3 through 5 are
actually instructive in that they help to explain the apparent contradiction with the results
from our initial regressions in Table 2. The contradictory results are, in fact, two sides of the
same coin: If the estimated peer-group eﬀects in Table 2 are chieﬂy due to omitted factors, the
model is misspeciﬁed, even though the J-test may fail to show it. In this situation, estimation
of the transformed model (8) should not only reveal the omitted variable bias (through lower
estimates of γ) but also improve the power of the associated speciﬁcation tests. This is precisely
what we ﬁnd. 12
Even the moderate consumption externalities that we ﬁnd for certain peer group speciﬁ-
c a t i o n ss t r i k eu sa sar e m a r k a b l eﬁnding. After all, the intuitively appealing notion of peer
eﬀects has a very speciﬁc and perhaps quite restrictive interpretation in our intertemporal
consumption model: faced with consumption externalities, individuals will try to smooth their
own consumption proﬁle relative to that of their peers. This prediction may be quite distinct
12It should be noted that other economists have estimated Euler equations based on food consumption data
from the PSID without rejecting the model. Examples include Zeldes (1989), Runkle (1991) and Dynan (2000).
Although several of our results imply a statistical rejection of the model, we do not deem this ﬁnding too
surprising. Indeed, the power of the typical J-test is very sensitive to both sample size and instrument choice.
Speciﬁcally, more extensive use of (weak) instruments would clearly work toward a non-rejection of the model
in our case, without changing any of our key results. In any case, since our model nests most of the previous
estimation approaches in the literature, results remain comparable.
26from what many people casually associate with the notion of peer eﬀects, including, for example,
a tendency of myopic overspending to "beat the Joneses". Of course, our results are conditional
not only upon our speciﬁc interpretation of peer eﬀects. Inevitably, they also depend upon (i)
the general validity of the life-cycle framework, for which the statistical J-test provides a less
comforting result than the economic "excess sensitivity" test; (ii) the speciﬁcd e ﬁnitions of peer
groups that we consider; (iii) and our identiﬁcation of peer eﬀects based on within-peer-group
diﬀerences in interest rates and demographic preference shifters, with the latter being treated
as exogenous. Accordingly, it will be interesting to confront our results with complementary
approaches using either an altogether diﬀerent modelling context, or alternative identiﬁcation
approaches within the same life-cycle framework, or simply new and better consumption data
as they become available.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we make two main contributions. First, we derive a suitable framework for
analyzing peer eﬀects, or ”keeping up with the Joneses”, in intertemporal consumption choice.
Second, we confront our model with micro data from the PSID to obtain empirical evidence
on such consumption externalities. Our approach has the advantage that it fully nests
more traditional versions of the intertemporal consumption model. Speciﬁcally, we derive
an otherwise standard Euler equation that allows individual utility to be also aﬀected by peer-
group consumption. This makes our results easily comparable to those in prominent prior
studies on the dynamic patterns of household consumption, such as Attanasio et al. (1999).
Focusing on the relevance of "external" habit formation, our paper also complements previous
microeconomic research on "internal" habits, notably Dynan (2000).
Starting with a simple Euler equation approach, we ﬁnd strong evidence for expected
consumption co-movement within reference groups constructed on the basis of age, gender,
race, family status, education, occupation and urbanity. This initial piece of evidence suggests
an important role for consumption externalities.
However, inference under this setup is very vulnerable to misspeciﬁcation, especially the
omission of demographic control variables. We argue that additional restrictions are required to
27discriminate between true peer-group phenomena and merely correlated eﬀects. Our solution
builds on the ”reﬂection problem” framework developed by Manski (1993, 1995), which we
adapt for the case of dynamic Euler equations with endogenous regressors.
C a s ti n t ot h em o r er o b u s tf r a m e w o r ko ft h er e ﬂection problem, our analysis suggests that
much of the observed co-movement in consumption reﬂects correlated eﬀects rather than true
consumption externalities. In particular, the very strong peer eﬀects suggested by the simple
Euler equation approach cannot be conﬁrmed.
Nonetheless, some of the evidence for peer eﬀects in intertemporal consumption choice
p e r s i s t s ,a so u rr e s u l t sp o i n tt om o d e r a t ec o nsumption externalities across a range of diﬀerent
plausible peer-group speciﬁcations. In our view, this ﬁnding provides some comfort with respect
to the many theoretical papers in modern macroeconomics that basically take peer eﬀects for
granted. Even so, more research is certainly warranted to deepen our understanding of how
social interaction aﬀects individuals’ intertemporal consumption choices.
28Appendix
A1: Marginal Utility for Isoelastic Preferences with Peer Eﬀects
The following exposition shows how peer eﬀects can be neatly introduced into the standard
CRRA utility framework that features prominently in much of the consumption literature.
Speciﬁcally, we derive an expression for marginal utility which is nested in the general
speciﬁcation we propose in this paper.
Consider the CRRA utility function incorporating peer eﬀects given by
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denotes the geometric mean of the current consumption levels
of an individual’s peers. This utility function nests the standard CRRA case for γ =0 .N o t e
f u r t h e rt h a tw eu s et h eg e o m e t r i cm e a np r i m a r i l yf o rt h es a k eo fa n a l y t i c a lc o n v e n i e n c ei n
deriving a linearized Euler equation. However, it could also be motivated by considering its
favorable properties with respect to the susceptibility to outliers.
The corresponding marginal utility is therefore
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Taking logs, we obtain
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or, using the fact that the natural log of the geometric mean equals the arithmetic mean of the
logged components,
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29This representation corresponds with the equation, (3), we use for modeling marginal utility.
A2: Derivation of the Euler Equation
This section follows the derivations in Attanasio and Browning (1995). We start with the
general Euler equation (2) given by
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Suppressing the conditional expectations operator, we can rewrite the above Euler equation as
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where e εt+1 denotes an expectational error with Et [e εt+1]=0 . Taking logs, we obtain
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Note that, by Jensen’s inequality, the error term now has nonzero expectation:
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This problem can be dealt with by using a second-order Taylor approximation of ln(1 +e εt) to
obtain
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=0 . Hence, the new error term has again zero
expectation under a variety of diﬀerent possible assumptions, e.g. homoskedastic expectation
30errors across households and over time.13 As a consequence of the approximation, omitted
higher-order moments are buried in the intercept. Although this makes it impossible to recover
the individual time preference rate β, we can still consistently estimate all other preference
parameters under the above assumptions.
Combining with our model for marginal utility, (3), we obtain
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or, rearranging terms,
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In order to further simplify the above equation, we use the approximation Xh
t ≈ Xh
t+1 to
obtain
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where  h
t+1 denotes the additional approximation error. While this last approximation is not
required for estimation in a standard Euler equation framework, it will prove very convenient
for the later derivation of further equilibrium conditions that will be needed to distinguish
between true consumption externalities and merely correlated eﬀects. Note also that the above
13A more primitive condition implying the above restriction is to assume joint log-normality of the relevant
variables. Although fairly restrictive, such an assumption is not uncommon in the literature on estimating
linearized Euler equations. Alternatively and less restrictive, we would obtain a similar estimating equation by
assuming that the innovations to the conditional moments of h εt+1 are uncorrelated with the instruments used
in the estimation.
31approximation is very accurate, because all but one of the stratiﬁcation variables we consider
never change for a given household over time.14 In particular, for the predominant case in
which strata in t and t +1are composed by the same households, the induced approximation
error term is identically zero by construction. Moreover, even a more substantial approximation
error would not pose a problem, as long as it is uncorrelated with the instruments used in the
estimation.
Finally, introducing some short-hand notation for the intercept and error terms, we can
represent the above linearized Euler equation by
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which coincides with equation (4) in the paper.
A3: Data Cleaning Procedures and Sample Selection
In total, our original sample contains 90,414 household year observations. We match household
information across years by means of the history of interview numbers provided with each wave
of the PSID. Where matching is not possible (for example, because information on interview
numbers from past years is missing) or ambiguous, we drop the respective observations from the
sample. In total, these deletions amount to a loss of 2,198 household years. We then proceed
by cleaning our sample from observations with implausible, missing or topcoded information.
Speciﬁcally, we delete 3,227 observations because of a zero in reported food expenditures at
home, 92 because of topcoding of this variable, 27 because of topcoded food expenditures at
restaurants, and 1,896 because of bad accuracy codes indicating that the respective information
is poorly measured. Further, we only consider households whose head is between 18 and 65
years old. This restrictions leads to the deletion of another 10,094 household years.
Note that our data set is an unbalanced panel, because split-oﬀs are treated as independent
households from the moment of the split-oﬀ. Moreover, we also treat households with a head
change as new households. The year in which the head change occurs is deleted from the
14Age, gender, race and education (as deﬁned for our purposes) are entirely time-invariant in our data. Thus,
only our measure of "urbanity" displays some (very limited) temporal variation.
32sample (5,991 household years). We delete 344 observations for which there is no educational
information, 288 observations because the household did not reside in continental USA, 60
household years because of missing race information and four because there is no major adult
present in the respective household and year.
As the PSID was mainly designed to study the income dynamics of the poor, it signiﬁcantly
oversamples these households relative to the population. We follow the literature and leave the
entire poverty subsample out of consideration. The likely presence of liquidity constraints for
this subpopulation might lead to a violation of the Euler equation for the respective households,
thus rendering our estimation approach invalid. Deletion of the poverty subsample means the
loss of another 21,335 observations. Lastly, as we are interested in estimating a consumption
Euler equation, we also have to discard households that are observed for a single year only
(1,233 observations). In total, the above data cleaning procedures amount to a deletion of
44,972 household years, which, nevertheless, leaves us with a fairly large sample consisting of
43,244 observations. However, we must also discard observations with missing values for the
individual-speciﬁc instruments used in the estimation. These deletions leave us with a sample
of 26,358 observations. For the estimations, we also delete the observations with the 0.75%
highest and lowest consumption growth rates in order to eliminate the inﬂuence of extreme
outliers. These deletions lead to a loss of an additional 396 observations. Finally, we also
eliminate observations that belong to very small population strata (less than 15 observations
in the baseline estimations), resulting in further data losses whose extent depends on the
particular stratiﬁcation at hand.
A4: Econometric Issues
Estimation
As all of the above models are formulated within a forward-looking, rational expectations
framework, they give rise to conditional moment restrictions that lend themselves to semipara-
metric estimation using GMM. Speciﬁcally, estimation is based on the orthogonality conditions
implied by rational expectations, coupled with the standard assumption that instruments are
33uncorrelated with higher-order moments buried in the intercept, due to the linearization.15
Further, in this framework it is straightforward to account for the endogeneity of the households’
after-tax interest rates as well as the relevant peer-group means in equations (5) and (8), by
excluding these variables from the instrument set and including other (lagged) variables instead.
Hence, the starting point is a set of moment conditions of the form
Et [ut+1|zt]=0 , (22)
where ut+1 represents the error term from the respective Euler equation and zt denotes the set
of instrumental variables contained in the information set of period t. A necessary condition
for identiﬁcation is that the dimension of the instrument set be larger or equal to the number
of parameters we want to estimate. Following the literature on Euler equation estimation, we
transform the set of conditional moment restrictions into unconditional ones. Estimation thus
exploits moment conditions of the following type:
Et [ut+1zt]=0 . (23)
Dropping time subscripts for notational convenience and specifying the determinants of the
expectation error u,w ec a nw r i t e
E [uz]=E [f (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g (X)],κ)] = 0, (24)
where f (·) now summarizes the dependence of the moment condition on the regressands y,t h e
instruments z, the standard regressors w, the reference group means ARITM [·|g (X)] and the
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Estimation of unconditional moment models of the form (24) is suﬃciently standard.
Because of the nonlinearities in (8), we use numerical optimization to obtain nonlinear GMM
15See, for example, Attanasio and Browning (1995), p. 1125.
34estimates. Throughout this paper, we only report results from two-stage estimation, noting
that the results remain virtually unchanged if further iterations are carried out (iterated GMM).
It is worthwhile to keep this in mind, as iterated GMM is normalization-invariant, while two-
stage GMM is not. The fact that our results are not sensitive to the number of iterations also
rules out the issue that Sargan tests may be adversely aﬀected by diﬀerences in normalization.
The presence of generated regressors in (5) and (8) leads to additional complications.
Speciﬁcally, as reference group means ARITM
h
·|X
j
t = Xh
t
i
are estimated in a separate ﬁrst
step, we must account for the sampling variability associated with the respective estimates
ARITMN [·|g(X)] to conduct proper inference. This is important given that we would like to
uncover possible peer eﬀects at the population level rather than within our sample only.16 The
next section contains a brief discussion of how we make the required adjustments.
Inference
To obtain consistent variance estimates in the presence of generated regressors, we follow Newey
and McFadden (1994) and adopt a "joint GMM" interpretation for the two estimation steps.
Basically, we "stack" the respective moment conditions from both estimation steps to form an
extended vector of moments. The derivations are considerably simpliﬁed by formulating the
moment conditions for both steps with reference to the entire sample rather than by individual
reference group. Thus, let dh
³
X
j
t
´
with t =1 ,..,T and j =1 ,...,G t denote a dummy equal to
one at time t if household h has characteristics X
j
t and zero otherwise. For any given household
h and time t, there is exactly one dummy equal to one, i.e. the dummy corresponding to her
respective reference group g
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. This step allows us to re-write the structural models (5)
and (8) as
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16Most empirical studies of social interactions do not account for the presence of ﬁrst-stage estimates when
conducting inference. While such an approach may be sensible for the case of "local" interactions prevalent
within a speciﬁc sample, e.g. neighborhood eﬀects, it is clearly inadequate for studying large-group social eﬀects
based on a random sample of the whole population of interest.
35and, respectively,
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The number of generated regressors in each case is given by the number of estimated
reference group means times the number of group years for which they have to be estimated.
Thus, we have 553 and 2,212 generated regressors in the ﬁrst and second case, respectively.
The advantage of re-writing the model in this way is that we can now express the estimated
reference group means ARITMN
h
·|g
³
X
j
t
´i
as coeﬃcients from ﬁrst-step OLS regressions of
the relevant variables v,i . e . ∆ln(Ct+1), ∆Dt+1 and lnRt+1, on the group-year dummies
d
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estimated on the entire sample. The additional moment conditions that will account
for the sampling variability introduced by the ﬁrst-step estimates are then nothing but the
scores of these auxiliary OLS regressions. The structure of the scores is relatively simple:
their components are the products of residuals and dummy variables, with all but one of the
latter being identical zero by construction. Hence, many of the additional ﬁrst-step moment
conditions can be conveniently ignored. Moreover, since both ﬁrst- and second-step moment
conditions are deﬁned for the full sample, corrected variance estimates can be computed using
the techniques presented in Newey and McFadden (1994).
Speciﬁcally, for t =1 ,..,T and j =1 ,...,G t,l e td(X) denote the vector of all d
³
X
j
t
´
.
Further, let m(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g(X)]) denote the scores of the ﬁrst-step regression
generating the group averages of the relevant variables v. Then our ﬁrst-step moment conditions
are obviously given by
E [m(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g (X)])] = 0. (27)
Since the estimates for ARITM [·|g(X)] are used as (generated) regressors in the second step,
36we can now write the corresponding second-step moment conditions as
E [f (y,z,w,ARITMN [·|g(X)],κ)] = 0, (28)
where the
√
N-consistent estimator for reference group means, ARITMN [·|g(X)], has replaced
the true population counterparts, ARITM [·|g (X)]. Applying Newey and McFadden (1994,
Theorem 6.1), we obtain an asymptotic distribution for the structural parameter estimates b κ
of the second stage given by
√
N ∗ T (b κ − κ) ∼ N(0,V) (29)
with
V = F−1
κ E
£
{f (·)+FARITMΨ(v,d(X))}{f (·)+FARITMΨ(v,d(X))}
0¤
F−10
κ (30)
and
f (·)=f (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g(X)],κ) (31)
Fκ = E [∇κf (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g (X)],κ)] (32)
FARITM = E [∇ARITMf (y,z,w,ARITM [·|g(X)],κ)] (33)
M = E [∇ARITMm(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g(X)])] (34)
Ψ(v,d(X)) = −M−1m(v,d(X),ARITM[·|g (X)]), (35)
where ∇κ and ∇ARITM denote partial derivatives with respect to κ and ARITM [·|g (X)],
respectively.
Each component of the adjusted variance matrix can be computed from its corresponding
sample analog. Note that the adjustment for the presence of generated regressors is embodied
in the expression FARITMΨ(v,d(X)) in (30). It is fairly easy to check that for each variable
over which we estimate peer-group means, this correction matrix amounts to the negative
deviations of a household’s own realizations from the respective peer-group means multiplied by
the respective peer-group coeﬃcients and the average realizations of the instruments among the
37peers. Thus, for the extreme case in which there are no social interactions at all, the correction
terms become zero and the variance formula collapses to the standard one.17 Intuitively,
sampling variability in the estimation of the reference group means is irrelevant for cases in
which there are no social interactions. On the other hand, the correction may become large
depending on the estimated reference group coeﬃcient as well as the sampling variability in
the variables for which the means are estimated.
One ﬁnal comment is in order: Since we use the estimated reference group means of the
exogenous variables as both regressors and instruments, it might seem that further adjustments
for the presence of generated instruments are required. This is not true, however, as all
measurable functions of any predated variable provide valid instruments. Thus, given our
conditional moment restrictions, the generated instruments have no eﬀect on the asymptotic
variance of the GMM estimator.18
17In this case FARITM =0holds.
18See Wooldridge (2002) p. 400 ﬀ. for a more detailed discussion.
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